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STATUTORY COMMENTS
In the face of increasing danger of injury resulting from improper
publications, legal remedies are needed to protect the public without
being unjust to the publisher. In view of the wide scope of many cur-
rent publications, these remedies should be uniform from one jurisdic-
tion to another. It is hoped, therefore, that legislators in jurisdictions
not already clearly committed to a single publication rule will earnestly
consider adoption of the uniform act. The primary evil of the common
law rule, from a venue standpoint, is the possibility of the bringing of
a multitude of suits, each upon the same publication, but within
separate venues. This is specifically prevented by the Uniform Single
Publication Act.37 A provision designating a primary publication
upon which the cause of action is to be based and from which the limi-
tation period might be measured, however, should be included if the
abuses nurtured by the multi-publication rule are to be thoroughly
corrected. The desired result could be obtained by adding the following
to the first section of the uniform act: 3s "This cause of action shall
arise at the time such publication or exhibition or utterance is initially
made." Such an amendment would dearly carry out the desire of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws "to adopt the rule as it has been
developed at common law in the states which have accepted it,"39 and
would be a sound step toward correcting our law in a limited area of
the field of tortious publications-a field which is greatly in need of re-
form legislation.
JoSPXH C. KNAKAL, JR.
THE FOUR MONTH DIVORCE "COOLING OFF" PERIOD
IN VIRGINIA
Faced with a steady increase in the divorce rate and family dis-
organization, many states have sought means to discourage divorce and
to promote family unity. Since a great many people seek a divorce in
order to marry someone else immediately thereafter, the divorce rate
may be substantially decreased, or so the theory runs, by prohibiting
remarriage within a specified time after the decree.1 Thus some states
grant an interlocutory decree which may not become final until a
-See note 7 Supra.
cIbid.
9C U.LA. 172 (1952).
'See Burks, The Code of 1919, 5 Va. L. Reg. (N.s.) 97, io8 (1919).
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later date.2 During the interim period the parties are still husband
and wife and, of course, neither can marry anyone else. Other states
grant an absolute divorce but place a prohibition on remarriage until
a specified time has elapsed after the decree is issued.3
Virginia recognized the problem and took steps towards its cor-
rection in 1918. The revisors of the Virginia Code of 1919 included a
new section,4 placing a prohibition on remarriage after divorces granted
for causes arising subsequent to the date of marriage. Judge Burks, in
commenting on the Code of 199,,5 stated, "Divorces are steadily in-
creasing in Virginia, as well as elsewhere, and are becoming so numer-
ous that the evil strikes at the heart of our civilization. For manifest
reasons the revisors inserted a new section declaring that 'On dissolu-
tion of the bond of matrimony for any cause arising subsequent to the
date of the marriage neither party shall be permitted to marry again
for six months from the date of such decree, and such bond of matri-
mony shall not be deemed to be dissolved as to any marriage subsequent
to such decree, or in any prosecution on account thereof, until the ex-
piration of such six months.' The time fixed by this section may be too
short, but it furnishes a foundation for further legislation on the sub-
ject, if the General Assembly should see fit to enact it."6
This statute is unique in that under it a divorce is absolute for
some purposes, while for the purpose of remarriage the parties are
deemed to remain husband and wife for a period of four months
(formerly six) after the decree is issued.7 Thus, instead of being a
2Cal. Civ. Code §§ 131, 132; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 56, § 13 (1935); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 13, §§ 1533, 1534 (1953); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 208, § 21 (1955); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 42:34 (1943); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2A: 34-18, 34-19 (1951); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 416,
§ 19 (1938); Utah Code Ann. tit. 40, § 3-7 (1943); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 988 (Supp.
1957); Wis. Stat. § 247.37 (1955).
'Ala. Code Ann. tit. 34, § 38 (1940); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-320 (1956); Iowa
Code § 598.17 (1954); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 6o-1512 (1949); Mass. Ann. Laws c.
208, § 24 (1955); Mich. Comp. Laws § 552.46 (1948) (prohibition may be placed on
guilty party at court's discretion); Minn. Stat Ann. § 517.03 (West Gum. Supp. 1949);
N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0502 (1943) (upon both parties at the discretion of the court);
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1280 (1951); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 916 (Gum. Supp.
1943); Vt. Stat. § 3215 (1947); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4722 (1955); Wis. Stat. § 245.03
(1955)-
Wa. Code Ann. § 5113 (1919), now Va. Code Ann. § 20-118 (1950).
5An address before the Virginia State Bar Association, May 6, 1919.
"Burks, The Code of 1919, 5 Va. L. Reg. (N.s.) 97, 1o8, (1919).
7"The Parties to the first marriage were absolved from many of the obligations
imposed by that marriage, but not from the obligation to refrain from marrying
another during the six months. As to this obligation, they continue to be husband
and wife for six months from the date of the decree for divorce, and neither could
lawfully intermarry with another." Heffinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 304, ui8 S.E.
STATUTORY COMMENTS
mere penal statute, this provision renders all marriages entered into
within the prohibited time absolutely void. Futhermore, the operation
of the statute is not confined to Virginia, but has extraterritorial effect.
In Heflinger v. Heflingers the leading case construing the statute, the
husband obtained a divorce from his wife in Virginia. A month later,
he and another woman, who was also a citizen and resident of Virginia,
went to Maryland, where they were married, and then returned to
Virginia to live. A few months thereafter, marital troubles having
arisen, the husband brought suit for an annulment of the marriage. In
affiirming the annulment of the marriage, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals discussed in detail the statute's extraterritorial effect.9 The gen-
eral rule that a marriage valid where performed is valid everywhere
was held to be inapplicable in this situation.10 The court reasoned
that since for purposes of remarriage the bond of matrimony was not
dissolved until six months after the decree, the husband was still mar-
ried to his former wife at the time of the second ceremony in Maryland.
Thus the parties were brought within the meaning of the Virginia
statute which provides in part that "If any persons, resident in this
state ... one of whom has a former husband or wife living .... shall,
with the intention of returning to reside in this state, go into another
state or country and there intermarry, and return to and reside in this
state, cohabiting as man and wife, such marriage shall be governed by
the same law, in all respects, as if it had been solemnized in this state.""
The court further said that, so far as remarriage within the prohibit-
ed period was concerned, the divorce in Virginia had no more effect
than a decree nisi, and the parties were incapable of contracting a
3i6, 321 (1923). See also In re Peart's Estate, 277 App. Div. 61, 97 N.Y.S.2d 879,
885 (1st Dep't 195o), noted in 8 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 183 (1951), in which a New
York court commented upon the Heflinger case, supra, as follows: "Moreover, taking
the opinion as a whole, what do we find? The parties are and are not divorced.
For all purposes except one, they are divorced and the decree is final at once." But
see 7 Va. L. Reg. (N.s.) 8oi, 818 (1922).
6136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316 (1923).
0The court also discusses at length the applicability of the equitable doctrine
of "clean hands," as applied to divorce litigation. The defendants wife attempted to
invoke the "clean hands" doctrine in order to prevent the husband from benefit-
ing from his own wrong. The court held that the public interest in invalidating the
marriage could not be denied by the application of the doctrine of "clean hands."
Id. at 296, n8 S.E. at 318.
"6The court stated that there are two well recognized exceptions to the general
rule: (i) marriages contrary to the laws of nature as generally recognized in Chris-
tian countries, and (2) marriages forbidden as a matter of public policy of the
state. This situation apparently fell within the latter exception. See Id. at 303, 118
S.E. at 320.
uVa. Code Ann. § 5o89 (1919).
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valid marriage anywhere. Thus, reasoned the court, if the question
had arisen in Maryland, the Maryland court would have had to give
effect to the Virginia statute under the full faith and credit clause of
the Federal Constitution.12
In Humphreys v. Baird,13 the Supreme Court of Appeals pointed
out that the statute expressly applies only to divorces for causes arising
subsequent to the date of matrimony. Also, it is not applicable to situa-
tions where one of the parties is dead, or legally presumed to be dead,
at the time of the decree, or where one of the parties dies subsequent
to the decree before the expiration of the prohibited period.
14
Since enactment, this statute has been twice amended: in 1934 and
again in 1944. The first amendment added the proviso that nothing in
the statute should be construed to prevent the divorced parties from
remarrying each other during the prohibited period.15 This change
seems to have been designed merely to reinforce the purpose of the
statute-i.e., to encourage reconciliation of the parties. The 1944
amendment reduced the period of prohibition from six months to
four months.16
The problem at which this statute is directed, the disintegration of
family life, is still acute in Virginia. Its effectiveness in curbing the
divorce rate would be very difficult to measure, but many practicing at-
torneys feel that it has had little, if any, effect. Some years ago, a move-
ment within the Virginia State Bar Association was unsuccessful in
repealing or amending the statute, largely because of the feeling of
many lawyers that although the law was ineffective in accomplishing its
purpose, at least it caused no harm.17 This observation cannot be sup-
uU.S. Const. art IV, § i. But see In re Peart's Estate, in which the Appellate
Division of New York held that a Virginia divorce did not have the effect of a
decree nisi, but rather was a final and absolute decree of divorce coupled with a
prohibition against remarriage. The court justified its refusal to follow the con-
struction placed upon the statute by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, saying:
"Generally speaking, we would be bound by the construction placed upon the
statute of another state by the highest court of that state. We have great respect
for the Virginia court rendering this decision. But when that court uses language
construing a statute which is not necessary for the decision of the case before it,
and sets forth what is and what is not entitled to full faith and credit in another
state, I do not conceive its views to be binding upon us." 27 App. Div. 61, 97
N.Y.S.2d 879, 885 (ist Dep't 1950).
1 197 Va. 667, 9 S.E.2d 796 (1956).
14Simpson v. Simpson, 162 Va. 621, 175 S.E. 32o (1934).
"6Va. Acts 1934, c. 287.
16Va. Acts 1944, c. 142.
'17At the 1935 meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association, the Committee on
Legislation and Law Reform recommended the repeal of Va. Code Ann. § 511 3
(1919). The report was referred to the Committee on Resolutions, which proposed,
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ported. Any statute which has the effect of avoiding marriages will,
frequently work a hardship on someone, as some women who have
thought they were widows of veterans of World Wars I and II have
learned to their sorrow. Survivors of veterans are entitled to gratuitous
benefits from the federal government. Until recently, however, the
claimant had to be the legal widow of a veteran before she became
eligible to receive any benefits.' s If it appeared that the parties were
married while either was under the statutory prohibition, according
to the Heflinger decision, the marriage was void. The claimant thus
could not qualify as the veteran's widow, and she would be unable to
participate in the benefits. Consider, for example, a husband who is
a veteran of World War I. He obtains a Virginia divorce from his
first wife on February 1, 1942, and marries a second woman in another
state on May 3o, 1942, the second "wife" not knowing of the previous
marriage and divorce. The couple return to Virginia and live happily
together until the husband dies in 1958. The second "wife" applies
to the Veterans Administration for widows' benefits and learns to her
surprise that under Virginia law she is not a widow-that, in fact, she
has not been married all these years and is not entitled to a stipend
from the government.
The Veterans Administration can alleviate some of the harsh conse-
quences of this statute by giving a narrow construction to the Hefling-
er decision. Moreover, where the claimant and decedent have traveled,
after the prohibited period, to a state which recognizes common law
marriage, a valid common law marriage may be found to exist, al-
rather than to repeal the section, to amend it so as to leave it to the discretion of the
judge whether to impose the period of prohibition upon the parties. The following
are excerpts from the floor discussion on this proposal:
"Judge W. T. McCarthy, of Oherrydale: Mr. President, my experience has
been that this section is one of the greatest disgraces on our statute books ....
"Judge E. Hugh Smith, of Heathsville: One of the reasons for putting that pro-
vision in the Code is that when a party is given a divorce, the other party takes it
to the Supreme Court, and after six months the Supreme Court denies the divorce,
where are you? That is the reason it was put in there.
"Mr. James G. Martin: The six months' idea had nothing to do with appeal.
It was put in by the codifiers so that people would not get divorces. It has done
no one any good, and it allows people to marry in good faith and then find out that
the man or woman did not have the right to marry."
The recommendation of the Committee on Resolutions was adopted. 47 Virginia
State Bar Association 48-49 (1935).
isThis situation has been alleviated in some degree by a recently passed federal
statute, which provides that where the marriage is void because of a legal impedi-
ment, the purported marriage shall be deemed valid if the woman did not know of
the impediment and lived with the veteran five years before his death. 71 Stat. go
(1957), as amended, 71 Stat. 485 (1957), 38 US.C.A. § 21o3 (1957).
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though the ceremonial marriage performed during the prohibited per-
iod was void.
Another basis of criticism, which alone justifies repealing or amend-
ing the statute, is that it introduces uncertainty into Virginia law. Just
what is the status of the divorced parties during the four month period?
In other words, for what purposes is the divorce final and for what
purposes does it act only as a decree nisi?10 What effect does it have
on property rights? May one party be compelled to testify in a criminal
proceeding against the other? May a party who remarries during the
prohibited period be prosecuted for bigamy? The statute is very unclear
on these questions, and the Supreme Court of Appeals has not had the
opportunity to clarify it. Until the statute is repealed or amended, or
until the Supreme Court of Appeals considers these questions, an en-
tirely unnecessary state of confusion will exist in Virginia law.
This statute is inherently productive of hardship; its only justifica-
tion is the overwhelming public interest in favor of stability of the
home. Since the statute does not accomplish its purpose, it follows that
it should be amended or repealed. One possibility would be to amend
the statute so as to give it the effect of a penal statute. A person con-
tracting marriage during the prohibitory period would be guilty of a
misdemeanor, but the marriage would be valid.
It appears unlikely that any measure that operates after the divorce
will have any degree of success in reducing the divorce rate. By the time
the parties have procured a divorce, the damage to the marital rela-
tionship has been done, and the possibility of their remarrying each
other is slight. A more sensible approach would be to provide for
some type of waiting period before the divorce, during which the
parties might have the opportunity to cool off and effect a reconcilia-
ion. The theory is that if the marriage is to be saved, this must be
done during the critical period prior to an embittering court battle.
Thirteen states have statutes providing for a lapse of time between the
institution of the suit and the hearing or entry of decree.20 Illinois
began experimenting in 1953 with this approach when the legislature
enacted statutes requiring the complainant to file a statement of in-
tention to institute the action at least sixty days before actually filing
"See note 7 supra.
2'Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Civ. 54(c) (1956); Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 56 § 1o(l) (1935),
Laws 1945, P. 316, § 2; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7333 (1949); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 40, §§ 23-29
(Smith-Hurd 1953); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-8O (Supp. 1957); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 6o-
1517 (1949); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.89(2) (1957); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-305.02 (1943);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 3105.09 (Baldwin 1953); S.C. Code § 20o-o8 (1952); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. art. 4632 (Supp. 1956); Vt. Stat. § 3255 (1947) (if children are involved);
Wash. Rev. Stat. § 982, Rev. Code of Wash. tit. 26, § 26.08.040.
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the complaint for divorce. During this sixty day waiting period the
judge was authorized to invite the parties into his chambers for the
purpose of attempting to effect a reconciliation.
21
From July 1953 through March 1954 the filing of actions for di-
vorce in Cook County declined 37.57 per cent, while divorces granted
declined 37.09 per cent.22 However, in People ex rel. Christiansen v.
Connel,2 3 the Supreme Court of Illinois held the statute to be violative
of the Illinois Constitution.2 4 Therefore, in 1955, the legislature en-
acted other laws, this time providing for a sixty day waiting period
after instituting the action for divorce, and omitting the provision
which allowed the court to attempt a reconciliation.2 This legislation
was upheld in People ex rel. Doty v. Connell.2 6 Under the new statutes
there has been a substantial reduction in the number of divorce de-
crees entered, despite the fact that the courts do not actively promote
reconciliations.27
It is submitted that Virginia's statute is impractical and unrealistic.
In many instances it has been productive of severe hardship. At best,
the statute can be said to breed unnecessary confusion in the minds of
attorneys and judges. The approach adopted by the state of Illinois
seems not only clear and workable, but it also appears to be accomplish-
ing for Illinois the purpose for which the Virginia statute was de-
signed-and which it has failed to accomplish. The General Assembly
of Virginia might well profit by a consideration of Illinois' answer
to this problem.
S. JAMES THOMPSON, JR.
"Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 40, §§ 23-29 (Smith-Hurd 1953).
'Miner, The "Cooling Off" Divorce Law, 42 A.B.A.J. 1131, 1132 (1956).
Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954).
- The court held that the statute violated § 19 of article II of the Illinois
Constitution, which affords the litigant an unqualified right of immediate access
to the courts, the right to obtain justice freely and without delay. An additional
constitutional objection, held the court, was the fact that the statute imposed non-
judicial functions upon the judge.
-S.HA. §§ 7a , 30, 31, 32 (1956).
-9 Ill. 2d 39o, 137 N.E.2d 849 (1956).
'Miner, The "Cooling Off" Divorce Law, 42 A.B.A.J. 1131 (1956).
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